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Abstract: Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority 
of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI).  Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates 
used under these treaties are gradually falling although the treaties themselves do not specify any 
such reductions.  Since there is no outside governing agency to redress treaty violations, such 
reductions must be both mutually beneficial and self-enforcing.  Furthermore, the optimal tax 
rates must be less than those initially set, otherwise no reductions would be necessary.  To explain 
such behavior, we model a two-country setting with two-way capital flows.  In particular, only 
part of FDI is immediately reversible.  As the extent of irreversibility increases, the likelihood of 
Pareto optimal tax rates obtaining as a self-enforcing outcome in the initial period is reduced.  
More modest tax reductions, from the non-treaty levels, are still possible.  These limited tax 
reductions generate an increase in bilateral FDI.  As countries increase the stock of capital in one 
another, further reductions in taxes become self-enforcing.  Depending on the extent of 
irreversibility and asymmetry, Pareto optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run.  Thus, 
the amount of inbound investment a country can attract may be related to the commitment to 
which its outbound investment binds it.  This final insight provides an additional rationale for the 
observed pattern of capital flows in which those countries with the greatest outbound capital 
flows are also those with the highest inbound flows. 
 
JEL Classification:  F21, F23, F13, C73. 
 
Key Words:  Foreign Direct Investment, Tax Treaties, Multinational Enterprise, Gradualism, 
Irreversibilities, Dynamic Games. 
 
 
*Department of Economics DM-309C, Florida International University, Miami, FL, 33199; 
Phone: (305) 348-3286; Fax: (305) 348-1524, E-mail: chisikr@fiu.edu. 
**1285 University of Oregon, Department of Economics, 533 PLC Building, Eugene, OR, 97403-
1285; Phone: (541) 346-4671; Fax: (541) 346-1243; E-mail: rdavies@oregon.uoregon.edu.  
We thank seminar participates at Georgetown University, the University of Miami, Oregon State 
University, the University of Western Ontario, the University of Copenhagen, the University of 
Kentucky, the 2001 Canadian Economic Association meetings, the Spring 2001 Midwest 
International Economics Group meetings, the Winter 2001 Econometric Society meetings, the 
Fall 2000 Southeast Theory and International Economics meetings, All errors are entirely the 
responsibility of the authors. 
 1
I.  Introduction 
 The use of dynamic tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is well 
known.  The vast majority of economic studies, however, examine only the use of tax holidays in 
which a host government offers a firm an initial period of reduced tax rates after which taxes 
increase to their standard levels.  While this is a powerful tool for attracting FDI, other types of 
tax incentives are also used.  One of the most common alternative methods is the bilateral tax 
treaty, which is the focus of this paper.   
A global network of nearly 2000 bilateral tax treaties governs international taxation 
(Radaelli, 1997).  In 1998, such treaties with the U.S. covered approximately 78 percent of total 
U.S. investment abroad and 96 percent of FDI within the U.S. (BEA, 1998).  Similar to tax 
holidays, bilateral treaties are intended to promote investment between treaty partners, however 
they differ from tax holidays in two key respects.  First, treaties are negotiated between two 
governments, not a government and a single firm.  As such, they apply to all investment between 
the two countries.  Second, rather than "front-loading" incentives as tax holidays do, treaty tax 
rates tend to gradually fall over time.  While this difference in the timing of tax reductions is 
interesting in and of itself, what is particularly intriguing is that rather than a simple one-time, 
permanent reduction in taxes, treaty tax rates fall incrementally.  Our goal is to offer one 
explanation for this gradual reduction in tax rates over time.   
  While tax treaties provide several avenues for FDI promotion, we will 
concentrate on their effect on withholding taxes.  When a firm invests overseas, it typically does 
so through a subsidiary that repatriates profits to its parent through dividends, interest, and royalty 
payments.  Since these payments are a cost to the subsidiary, they are not taxable by the host 
country as part of the subsidiary's income.  Nevertheless, most host governments capture part of 
this parent income through a withholding tax levied on the repatriation.  For example, the 
standard, non-treaty U.S. withholding tax on dividends, interest payments, and royalties is 30 
percent.  Under a tax treaty, each government agrees to lower the withholding tax rates it applies 
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to payments made to recipients who reside in the partner country.  Specifically, tax treaties reduce 
withholding taxes by specifying maximum allowable tax rates.  These maximum rates are as low 
as zero and are almost always identical for both treaty partners.1  Similar to the tariff reductions 
specified in many bilateral and regional trade agreements (such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the 
U.S.-Israel free trade agreement) reductions in taxes often occur incrementally.  Some sequential 
tax reductions are specified by timetables written into the treaties themselves, while others are 
achieved through renegotiation.  Table 1 provides examples of both types of sequential 
reductions.  As Table 1 shows, the first U.S.-Canadian treaty was signed in 1941 and 
implemented a royalty withholding tax of 15 percent.  This rate was lowered to 10 percent during 
renegotiations in the late 1970's.  According to the Price-Waterhouse Corporate Taxes: A World-
Wide Summary, this tax was reduced to zero in 1997, although the treaty itself does not yet reflect 
this change.  Additionally, the parental dividend tax fell from 15 to 10 to 5 percent over the same 
period.   
TABLE 1 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 As stated in the introduction to the OECD's model tax treaty, the goal of a treaty is to 
"remove the obstacles that double taxation presents to the development of economic relations 
between countries" (OECD, 1997, pg. I-1).  Since reducing tax rates may mitigate the investment 
distortions due to tax policy, these reductions can be efficiency-improving.  However, if lower tax 
rates are preferable, why are the lowest rates not chosen at the outset of the treaty?  One answer is 
that they are not self-enforcing.  Since there is no external body that can enforce tax treaties, a 
treaty must be self-enforcing as well as mutually beneficial.   
Key to our explanation is the irreversible nature of bilateral FDI.  A treaty that specifies a 
large tax reduction, and thus a large inflow of irreversible FDI, may create more temptation than a 
country can resist.  This leads the violator to tax the irreversible inbound investment heavily and 
                                                 
1 For information on the specifics of treaties, see the treaties themselves which are collected by Diamond 
and Diamond (1998). 
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to minimize outward investment so that it has less FDI trapped overseas which can be taxed in 
retribution.  Alternatively, a small tax decrease can be self-enforcing for both countries.  Since 
this tax reduction applies to both nations' investors, it increases FDI in both directions.  Now, if a 
country deviates, it has more captive FDI in its partner, allowing the partner to exact a harsher 
punishment if a violation occurs.  Additionally, when FDI is less reversible, this increases the 
length of the punishment phase in which the other country can implement a punitively high tax 
rate.  These two effects imply that a country with a relatively large amount of outbound FDI is 
less likely to deviate from a tax treaty and will find a larger set of tax rates to be self-enforcing.  
A further implication is that a reduction in tax rates in the current period increases the current 
amount of outbound FDI, expanding the following period's set of self-enforcing tax rates.  Thus, 
one reduction in tax rates makes additional reductions self-enforcing.  Therefore, through gradual 
tax reductions, countries can approach an efficient allocation of capital even though they could 
not credibly commit to such a policy at the treaty's outset. 
 We formalize the above argument by presenting a model of two countries with bilateral 
FDI.  Without a treaty, governments cannot credibly commit to the efficient tax rates, resulting in 
an inefficient equilibrium with high tax rates and low levels of FDI.  A tax treaty improves on this 
outcome by allowing governments to coordinate on a pair of Pareto improving tax rates.  Because 
of the initially low levels of FDI, Pareto-optimal tax rates may not be self-enforcing at the outset 
of the treaty.  Despite this, as long as investment is not entirely irreversible and governments care 
sufficiently about the future, some Pareto improving tax reduction is credible.  This leads to a 
small increase in FDI and expands the set of self-enforcing tax rates.  This makes additional tax 
reductions possible and implies that through gradually falling tax rates countries can achieve 
mutually beneficial tax rates that were not sustainable in the early stages of the treaty.  If 
countries are sufficiently asymmetric or if investment is sufficiently irreversible, then there exists 
an inefficient limit to the tax reductions, however, this cooperative outcome is still a Pareto 
improvement over the non-treaty equilibrium. 
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 Although we are unaware of any work studying gradualism in tax treaties, there are 
obvious parallels between this gradualism and that found for tariffs under self-enforcing trade 
agreements.  Staiger (1995), Furusawa and Lai (1998), Devereux (1997), and Chisik 
(forthcoming) all analyze gradual tariff reductions that are determined endogenously along with 
the evolution of an economy-wide state variable.  In an approach similar to ours, Chisik finds that 
an initial reduction in tariffs leads to an increase in irreversible country-specific export capacity.  
This increase in capacity increases the cost of a trade war and makes further tariff reductions 
possible.  This idea of partner-specificity is particularly appealing for FDI, since by the nature of 
its physical location, it is partner-specific.  When combined with the bilateral FDI tax competition 
model of Davies (forthcoming), this approach works well to describe gradualism in tax treaties. 
 As noted above, tax treaties and tax holidays differ in both the negotiating parties 
(government-government versus government-firm) and the timing of tax reductions.  These 
differences are best illustrated by contrasting our results with those of Thomas and Worrell 
(1994).2  In their paper, the host government is unable to credibly commit to low taxes on 
inbound FDI, leading to inefficiently low levels of investment.  Nevertheless, it is incentive 
compatible for the host to offer the firm a tax holiday in early periods to induce additional 
investment that it can then later tax.3  In their unidirectional framework with one host and one 
firm, the only possible punishment for a host that breaks an agreement is the withholding of 
                                                 
2 Bond and Samuelson (1989a) and Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994) also consider the relationship 
between tax holidays and the obsolescing bargaining problem, however, they do not discuss gradualism. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) suggest that when a country would prefer to commit but cannot, the threat of 
punishment by a foreign country can improve a country's credibility and raise its welfare.  We formalize 
this idea by explicitly considering how the foreign punishment endogenously evolves in the context of tax 
treaties.  Bond and Samuelson (1986) offer a different rationale for tax holidays in an environment in which 
two countries with private information about a country-specific productivity parameter compete for FDI.  
They find that the country with the higher productivity can signal this private information to the firm by 
offering a longer-lasting tax holiday.  Aizenman (1996) does not consider gradualism or tax holidays, but 
does include FDI in a model of managed trade.  He finds that since FDI is a substitute for exports, FDI can 
reduce the time inconsistency problem in trade negotiations.   
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further investment.  For this reason, the tax policy is backloaded: taxes are initially low and 
increase over time.  FDI, meanwhile, increases over time (although it remains inefficiently small).  
Their unidirectional framework captures the dynamics of tax holidays along with the 
phenomenon of gradually increasing investment.  Our bi-directional framework, on the other 
hand, finds that under tax treaties bi-directional FDI gradually increases while tax rates gradually 
decrease over time.  Furthermore, our approach shows that bilateral investment irreversibility 
may help to ameliorate the time inconsistency problem that is evidenced in the unidirectional 
framework and, therefore, brings in to question this rationale for tax-holidays.   
 We proceed as follows.  The next section presents the model and derives the equilibrium 
without a tax treaty.  Section III introduces tax treaties and discusses their implications for the 
path of tax rates over time.  Section IV considers asymmetries between the treaty partners.  
Section V concludes. 
II.  A Simple Model of Bilateral FDI and Taxation 
A.  Investors 
Consider two countries, home and foreign, each of which are endowed with inelastic 
capital stocks, K and K*, respectively.4  In each period, investors can invest either at home or 
overseas.  The amount of home (foreign) FDI in foreign (home) during period t is denoted Zt 
(Zt*).  Home capital that remains at home is used to produce a good according to the production 
function h(K-Zt).  Home capital located in foreign produces the same good using the production 
function hs(Zt).  The price of this good is constant and normalized to one.  Both production 
functions satisfy the Inada conditions and are increasing and strictly concave in capital.  
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Bond and Park (forthcoming) utilize a similar methodological approach to show that gradualism may arise 
as a symptom of time-inconsistency in tariff setting by a large country which trades with a small country 
when the small country desires to smooth consumption over time.  In contrast with the other papers in the 
gradualism literature these this work demonstrates the existence of gradualism even in the absence of an 
endogenously evolving state variable.  
4 Alternatively, we could permit capital to grow at some exogenous rate.  This makes FDI more attractive 
over time, but does not change the intuition regarding the role of irreversibility.  Therefore, for the sake of 
brevity, we retain the assumption of fixed capital stocks. 
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Investment irreversibility is captured by γ ∈ [0, 1] and the constraint that Zt ≥  γZt-1.  This 
irreversibility can represent the time to dismantle or sell off assets, the effort of training immobile 
factors of production such as foreign workers, or the cost of tailoring production to the overseas 
market.  If γ = 0, then all FDI is immediately reversible.  If γ = 1, it is impossible to recall 
overseas investment.  The irreversibility parameter is exogenous.5   
A more general interpretation of the model is to replace h(K-Zt) with a function of Zt, 
h% (Zt), where this function simply represents the increasing and convex cost of FDI.6  This 
interpretation is particularly attractive for some of the most irreversible types of FDI such as 
tourist facilities or natural resource extraction.  In this case, the irreversibility parameter reflects 
the difficulty of liquidating this investment.  Alternatively, if investors have access to a limited 
amount of resources, then this cost can represent the opportunity cost of dedicating physical and 
human capital to investment projects in the foreign country.  Although we discuss this as a drop 
in domestic output, it could just as easily represent the decrease in subsidiary activity in other 
(non-modeled) countries.  For example, if production location decisions, plant development, and 
worker training have to be planned far in advance, an increase in a subsidiary’s output implies 
reducing output (or not making expansions) elsewhere by the firm.  A third interpretation is that a 
recurring direct cost of FDI may represent the cost of acquiring funds from global capital 
markets.  Here, an increasing marginal cost of capital may be particularly appropriate for a firm 
with large overseas investments since overseas projects may be considered more vulnerable to 
both exchange rate and expropriation risks as well as agency problems.  A final interpretation of 
                                                 
5 Although we make the irreversibility parameter exogenous, this need not be true in practice.  For example 
it may be possible for investors to choose alternative technologies or split their investment between easily-
reversible portfolio investment and less reversible direct investment.  While this case is highly intriguing, 
given the complexity of the current model we leave this extension to future research. 
6 It is not necessary that this cost is strictly convex in the investment level, Zt, (i.e. that h(K-Zt) is strictly 
concave), for it is possible that this cost merely reflects the constant cost of obtaining capital on world 
markets.  For an interior solution we do require strict concavity of the benefit (or strict convexity of the 
cost) of investing.  If h(Z)%  truly reflects a capital cost, then it is important to note that we are assuming 
that the cost is paid every period rather than a one time cost.   
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h%  is simply an increased cost of global coordination by the firm.  Thus, although we explicitly 
model the cost of FDI as the opportunity cost of home production forgone, it is not necessary to 
include domestic production in our model.   Our adopted approach does present an advantage in 
that it allows us to easily consider one potential difference between treaty partners - their 
available capital stocks.  In any case, we only require that FDI comes at some cost and that when 
reversibility is not perfect some portion of this cost must still be borne by investors. 
  Similarly, foreign investors split their capital between foreign production, f(K*-Zt*), and 
production in the home country, fs(Zt*), under analogous assumptions regarding the behavior of 
the production functions and irreversibility.7  The price of the foreign good is also inelastic and 
equal to one.  It is important to note that there is no substitutability between the home and foreign 
capital stocks, indicating that capital is specific to the good produced by each country.  This 
would be the case if the differentiated products embody proprietary technology, patents, brand 
names or country-of-origin reputations. 8  According to Caves (1996), these are common features 
of multinational corporations.   
FIGURE 1 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1.  At the beginning of each period, 
governments simultaneously announce tax rates to domestic and overseas investors.  Although it 
is not necessary for our results, we permit governments the ability to announce different tax rates 
to each group of investors.  Thus, a government can warn its investors in advance of a planned 
                                                 
7 For now we assume that γ = γ* to conserve on notation.  We explicitly consider the case in which γ ≠ γ* in 
section IV.C. below.   
8 As Markusen and Venables (1998) show, such two-way capital flows can arise even between identical 
countries in a differentiated products industry.  This non-substitutability assumption is not necessary under 
our alternative interpretation of h(K-Zt) as a cost. 
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deviation from the cooperative treaty tax rates.9  Such a warning could be an explicit signal to 
investors, or it could simply be the result of home investors being more knowledgeable about the 
political climate in the home country than are the relatively distant foreign investors.  The home 
(foreign) government’s announced tax rate to the home (foreign) investors in period t is A *At t( )τ τ .  
The home (foreign) government's announced tax rate to foreign (home) investors is a *at t( )τ τ .  
Although we permit the possibility, we show below that neither government will announce 
anything other than the cooperative tax rate to overseas investors.  Following tax rate 
announcements, investors simultaneously commit capital allocations for the period (subject to 
their irreversibility constraints).  After capital allocations are made and observed by both 
governments, both countries set actual tax rates *t t( , )τ τ and production values are realized. 10  The 
ability to revise tax rates from their announced levels implies that tax rates can be changed faster 
than investment decisions.  Given the observed efficiency of most governments, this is perhaps 
the most fanciful of our assumptions.   
 Home investors maximize the present value of lifetime profits by choosing a stream of 
FDI.  These profits, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor and E(τt*) is the expected foreign tax 
rate in time t, are given by:11,12,13 
                                                 
9 The ability to notify one's own investors before a deviation allows the deviating country to begin reducing 
its FDI earlier than the surprised country.  We believe that this possibility for coordination between the 
government and its own investors is the more natural case to consider.  On the other hand, if governments 
do not (or cannot) warn their own investors, then no investors can respond until the period following the 
deviation.  In Appendix B, we analyze when the government would choose not to inform their own 
investors and we show that gradualism still occurs.    
10 This timing is similar to that used by Lapan (1988), McLaren (1997) and Bond and Park (forthcoming) in 
their discussion of trade agreements.  As in those studies, this timing creates the potential for time 
inconsistency in government policy.  The important difference, here, is that bilateral investment 
irreversibility can mitigate the time inconsistency problem. 
11 Although our model is completely deterministic, investor's decisions in the current period take into 
account their expectation of future tax rates.  Thus, E(τ*t) is the anticipated future foreign tax rate which is 
conditional on the current period's history rather than on some stochastic process.   
12 Note that home investors pay no home tax.  Since the home government has no incentive to distort home 
investor decisions, this is optimal from the home government's perspective.  As long as the home 
government can set discriminatory taxes on foreign investors operating within its borders, such an optimum 
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t t t
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δ π τ = δ − + − τ∑ ∑ .    (1) 
The irreversibility constraint requires that: 
Zt ≥ γZt-1.         (2) 
Investors are forward-looking and allocate their capital taking into account both expected 
future tax rates and how their decisions affect government actions (such as deviations from a 
treaty).  As shown below, if foreign taxes are not expected to increase in the future, (2) is non-
binding.  With this in mind, as long as the expected foreign tax rate is less than one, the home 
investor will pick a positive level of investment, Z(K, E(τt*)) which equates the domestic and 
overseas after-tax rates of return.  This yields the home capital market equilibrium condition in 
period t: 
* s
t k t k t(1 E( ))h (Z ) h (K Z ) 0− τ − − = .      (3) 
If taxes are expected to rise at some point in the future, then a condition similar to (3) can be 
derived.  Since efficiency-improving tax treaties will exhibit non-increasing tax rates, this result 
is not presented.14  An interior solution to equation (3) yields to the following comparative statics 





t t kk kk
dZ h 0
dE( ) (1 E( ))h h
= <τ − τ + ;      (4) 
 t kk* s
t kk kk
Z h (0,1)
K (1 E( ))h h
∂ = ∈∂ − τ + .      (5) 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Equation (1) indicates that profits are repatriated at the end of the period in which they are earned.  Since 
production is a function only of capital which is inelastically supplied, there is no incentive for the 
subsidiary to retain its earnings.  Hartman (1985) considers a case in which a subsidiary can be financed 
either through retained earnings or capital flows from the parent.  Because retained earnings avoid 
withholding taxes, this represents a cheaper form of finance than parent equity.  Thus, Hartman suggests 
that withholding taxes will only influence the behavior of mature, i.e. non-expanding, subsidiaries.  If taxes 
do not influence FDI, then there would be little reason to negotiate a treaty.  Therefore, we have chosen 
what we feel is the simplest model of subsidiary finance in which taxes affect FDI.   
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Blonigen and Davies (2000) find empirical evidence of a negative relationship between 
withholding taxes and FDI for inbound U.S. investment.  This result indicates that as long as tax 
rates do not rise in the future, investors will not choose to retract investment, implying that the 
irreversibility constraint is non-binding.  Blonigen and Davies, Brainard (1997), and others have 
found a positive correlation between FDI and a country's available funds.    
 Given the similarities between the home and foreign investors, if home taxes are not 
expected to rise in the future, then an interior equilibrium in the foreign capital market in period t 
is given by: 
 * * s *k t t k tf (K Z ) (1 E( ))f (Z )− = − τ .       (6) 
A comparable set of comparative statics can be derived. 
B. Governments 
Each government chooses its tax rate in each period to maximize the present value of its 
national income subject to the capital market equilibrium conditions (3) and (6), irreversibility 
constraints (2), and investor expectations.  Denote the actual home and foreign tax rates in each 
period by τt and τt*.  Tax rates are constrained to the unit interval.  Governments share the same 
discount rate as investors.  This implies that home and foreign national incomes are:15 
t t * * * t * s s *
t t t t t t t t t t
t 1 t 1 t 1
I I(K,K ,Z ,Z , , ) [h(K Z ) (1 E( ))h (Z ) f (Z )]
∞ ∞ ∞
= = =
δ = δ τ τ = δ − + − τ + τ∑ ∑ ∑ , (7) 
and 
t * t * * * t * * s * * s
t t t t t t t t t t
t 1 t 1 t 1
I I(K ,K,Z , Z , , ) [f (K Z ) (1 E( ))f (Z ) h (Z )]
∞ ∞ ∞
= = =
δ = δ τ τ = δ − + − τ + τ∑ ∑ ∑ . (8) 
As equations (7) and (8) indicate, taxes both redistribute income between countries and distort 
capital flows.  World income in each period, which is invariant to redistributions between 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 If expected future tax rates are lower than the current expected value, then there is still no incentive to 
engage in investment in excess of what (3) dictates.  This occurs since additional investment can be put off 
until the expected tax reduction, avoiding the cost of presently doing so.  If there were some cost to 
installing FDI, this need not be the case. 
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countries, is maximized when tax rates are zero.  Define these optimum FDI levels as Zopt = Z(K, 
0) and Z*opt = Z*(K*, 0).  As we show in Proposition 1 below, these optimal investment levels and 
the maximization of world income cannot be obtained without a tax treaty.  
C.  Equilibrium in the Absence of a Tax Treaty 
 As a benchmark case, consider the equilibrium that arises in the absence of a tax treaty.  
Without a tax treaty, governments do not condition their action on history and choose myopically 
optimal tax rates based solely on the current period FDI levels.  These Markov strategies yield a 
particularly stark outcome.  Because FDI is fixed in the third stage of every period, the best 
response for both governments is to fully tax away the profits on any inbound FDI.  Correctly 
forecasting this third stage outcome, investors do not add any FDI in the second stage.  As a result 
of this time inconsistency problem, the government’s announced tax rate in the first stage is non-
credible and immaterial in the resulting equilibrium.  Furthermore, because no FDI is added, the 
physical environment does not change in the following period and the same inefficient outcome is 
obtained.  A subgame-perfect equilibrium in these Markov strategies is a Markov-perfect 
equilibrium (MPE).  It is the unique equilibrium in the absence of a tax treaty and it is described 
in Proposition 1.16     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 The assumption of national income maximization follows Bond and Samuelson (1989b), Janeba (1995) 
and others. 
16 Alternative assumptions on belief structures, irreversibility, or timing can temper the severity of the non-
treaty tax rates.  Bond and Samuelson (1989a), Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994), and Thomas and 
Worrall (1994) demonstrate the existence of positive FDI equilibria even without a tax treaty.  When the 
host government does not hold all the bargaining power after investment occurs, their gain from continued 
future investment can outweigh their gain from short-term expropriation.  This desire for reputation 
provides credibility to an announced tax rate less than one.  It will still be the case, however, that 
investment is inefficiently low, leaving room for a tax treaty.  Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) 
provide a fascinating historical analysis of how medieval merchant guilds provided the multilateral 
reputation incentives that reduced the desire to fully tax away the profits on any inbound FDI.  
Incorporating this initial unilateral FDI would not change our main result that increases in bilateral FDI can 
generate lower tax rates, however, it can alter the initial dynamic of a tax treaty.  (See footnote 19 below.)  
Alternatively, as Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) point out, credibility can be gained through side agreements 
such as a trade treaties.  These provide an avenue for punishment similar to the one we discuss. 
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Proposition 1:  (a.)  In the unique MPE of the entire game, m *mt tZ Z 0= =  and m *mt t 1τ = τ =  for 
all t.  (b.)  There is a unique MPE in the continuation game starting in period s: m *mt t 1τ = τ =  for 
all  t ≥ s and m t s 1 *m t s 1 *t s 1 t s 1Z Z , Z Z− + − +− −= γ ⋅ = γ ⋅  for t = (s, s+1,…). 
Proof:  Consider the home country in an arbitrary period t.  Their optimal choice of τt in the third 
stage of period t maximizes (7).  The first order condition for τt is: 
 
*
s * s *t t
t t k t
t t
I Zf (Z ) f (Z )∂ ∂= + τ∂τ ∂τ . 
Note that Zt* is fixed in stage three, therefore, ∂ Zt*/∂τt = 0.  This implies that home will set its tax 
rate as high as possible, i.e. τt = 1.  Knowing this, foreign investors will minimize FDI, indicating 
that Zt*= Max {0, γZ*t-1}.  It is straightforward to verify that this is the only equilibrium.  
Similarly we can show that τt* =1 is optimal for the foreign country implying that                        
Zt = Max {0, γZt-1}.  Finally note that the above result holds for any period t.    
 
The first part of Proposition 1 shows that without a tax treaty no FDI occurs.  Part b of 
the proposition is a direct extension of part a.  It indicates that if an existing tax treaty is ever 
voided and nations return to competitively set tax rates, then the unique outcome is similar to the 
austere no-treaty outcome: taxes are set at their maximal level, and investors remove FDI as fast 
as the irreversibility constraint permits.  Since the equilibrium without a treaty is clearly 
inefficient, we now depart from this benchmark case to consider the role of tax treaties in 
ameliorating this dire equilibrium. 
III.  Gradualism in Cooperative Tax Rates 
 An efficiency-improving tax treaty specifies a path of tax rates c *ct t t 1{ , }
∞
=τ τ  that does not 
move farther away from the Pareto efficient zero tax rates as time progresses.  Given the lack of 
an international enforcement agency, we concentrate on those treaties that are self-enforcing in 
 13
each period.  We also assume that the only instrument that each government has at its disposal is 
its tax rate.17  Finally, since almost all treaties specify identical withholding taxes for both treaty 
partners, we impose the additional constraint that both countries levy the same tax rate, τt.  This 
constraint will not be binding in the symmetric case considered in section III.  In section IV we 
consider asymmetries between the treaty partners and show how these differences, coupled with 
the same tax rate constraint, can affect the treaty outcome.   
A.  Tax-Treaty Strategies 
A common form of self-enforcing mechanism relies upon “grim” strategies that mandate 
that any deviation from the specified cooperative action generates an infinite reversion to a 
punishment stage.  A credible punishment threat relies on continuation payoffs from a perfect 
equilibrium (often the most undesirable static Nash equilibrium).  The evolution of the state 
variable, here, precludes reversion to a static Nash equilibrium.  A natural counterpart in dynamic 
games such as this one where past play can alter the current period state variable is an infinite 
reversion to the worst MPE for the offending party.18  From Proposition 1, we know that there is a 
unique MPE following any deviation and we use this MPE in describing the subgame-perfect tax-
treaty strategies.  These tax-treaty strategies imply that if a deviation occurs, then governments 
return to their non-cooperative tax rates.19   
To facilitate a formal representation of these tax-treaty strategies we introduce the 
following notation.  The history through period t is t t *t t *tH { , ,Z ,Z }= τ τ , where t 0, 1 t{ ,..., }τ = τ τ τ  
                                                 
17 Although side payments, or concessions on alternative international agreements, may constitute a portion 
of all international negotiations, we follow the tax treaties themselves which make no mention of side 
payments.  
18 For early examples of such punishments in dynamic games with an evolving state variable, see papers by 
Ausubel and Deneckere (1987), Cave (1987) and Radner and Benhabib (1992). 
19 A self-enforcing, individually-rational treaty requires that the payoff to the treaty exceeds not only the 
payoff to deviating, but also the payoff to not entering the treaty in the first place.  Under our assumption of 
no initial FDI (see footnote 16), any incentive-compatible treaty is also individually rational.  Under 
alternative assumptions, the non-treaty equilibrium still requires high positive tax rates, however, they need 
not equal one.  The initial self-enforcing tax rates analyzed in Propositions 2, 3 and 4 may, therefore, 
exceed the non-treaty rates and fail to be individually rational.  As Proposition 5 suggests, this may be a 
particular difficulty for highly asymmetric countries.   
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is a vector of past home tax rates, t 0 1 tZ {Z ,Z ,...,Z }=  is a vector of past home investment, and τ*t 
and Z*t are the foreign counterparts.  When adhering to the tax treaty these taxes and FDI levels 
take on their cooperative values: τct = { c c0 1 t, ,...,τ τ τ } and Zct = { c c0 1 tZ ,Z ,...Z }.  To see explicitly 
the conditioning of these strategies upon history, denote θt+1 as the function that maps histories 
onto the government’s action in period t+1:  t * *at 1 t 1 t 1 t 1(H ,Z , )+ + + +θ τ → τ .  Similarly the home 
investor’s action is t A *at 1 t 1 t 1 t 1(H , , ) Z+ + + +ζ τ τ → .  The tax-treaty strategies are defined as follows: 
t 1+θ  =  ct 1+τ  if Ht = {τct, τ*ct, Zct, Z*ct}, * *ct 1 t 1Z Z+ +=  and *a *ct 1 t 1+ +τ = τ  
 mt 1+τ  = 1 otherwise; 
ζt+1 =  c *ct 1 tZ Z(K, )+ = τ  if Ht = {τct, τ*ct, Zct, Z*ct}, A ct 1 t 1+ +τ = τ  and *a *ct 1 t 1+ +τ = τ  
  m ct 1 tZ Z+ = γ  otherwise.       (9) 
 These tax-treaty strategies are straightforward.  If the tax treaty has been adhered to in the 
past, and if it appears that the foreign country intends to adhere to it in the current period, then the 
home country sets its current taxes according to the tax treaty.  After any other history they 
abandon the treaty.  Investors have similar strategies.  If there have been no deviations in the past 
and there is no indication that either government intends to deviate from the treaty in the current 
period, then home investors invest according to the expected treaty tax rate.  Similar tax-treaty 
strategies can be described for the foreign country.  In the presentation that follows we focus, 
without loss of generality, on the incentives of the home country. 
The foreign government may inadvertently be alerted to a deviation in period d in two 
ways.  First, if home announces something other than cdτ  to the foreign investors, all agents 
correctly anticipate both that τd = 1 and that the agreement will collapse in period d+1.  This leads 
all investors to immediately begin reducing FDI and causes the foreign government to break from 
their announcement and set τd* = 1.  Since such a move by home reduces both their overseas 
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profits in the deviation period and their tax revenues, this is clearly not an optimal strategy on 
home's part.  Therefore, the home country always announces the cooperative tax to foreign 
investors.   
Second, if the home government informs home investors of a planned deviation, then the 
tax-treaty strategies indicate that the home investors would choose to reduce investment and 
inadvertently signal this deviation to the foreign country.  At first glance, it may not appear 
obvious that this information revelation is in the best interests of the home investors.  If home 
investors ignore the announcement and increase their stock of irreversible FDI, they will maintain 
the cooperative foreign tax for period d but will have greater trapped FDI (and greater losses) in 
the future.  Therefore, home investors reduce FDI and tip off the foreign government only if:   
t d t d 1 t d *c s
d 1 d d d
t d
(h(K Z ) h(K Z )) (1 )h (Z )
∞ − − + −
−
=
δ − γ − − γ ≥ − τ∑ ,  (10) 
where Zd and Zd-1 are functions of the expected cooperative tax rates.  We show in Appendix B 
that because home's national income is the sum of home investors' profits and tax revenues from 
inbound FDI, equation (10) is also the necessary and sufficient condition for the home 
government to choose to warn its investors.  Hence, if home finds it optimal to warn its investors, 
then their optimal action is to terminate cooperative behavior immediately.  We show in 
Appendix B that (10) is more likely to be satisfied if the degree of irreversibility and/or the 
discount rate is larger.  Since our main result shows that gradualism occurs if the degree of 
irreversibility is sufficiently large, we proceed under the assumption that (10) holds, implying that 
the home government will forewarn its investors of a planned deviation, and defer the alternative 
case to Appendix B.  We show, there, that if (10) does not hold or if governments cannot 
forewarn their investors, then the magnitude of tax reductions is reduced, which strengthens our 
gradualism result. 
B.  Tax-Treaty Payoffs 
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Whether or not equation (10) holds, foreign investors are taken by surprise when a 
deviation occurs.  When (10) holds home investors begin reducing FDI in the deviation period.  
This asymmetry of FDI during the deviation period and subsequent punishment stage is a 
distinguishing characteristic of this case.  Using the investors' tax-treaty strategies, this implies 
that the deviation period FDI levels by the informed home investors and the surprised foreign 
investors are respectively given by: 
c *c * *c * * c
d d 1 d 1 d d dZ Z Z(K,E( )); Z Z Z (K ,E( )).− −= γ ⋅ = γ ⋅ τ = = τ    (11) 
 If both countries abide by the tax-treaty, then the home country’s payoff in period t is: 
 c * c *c c *c s c c s *ct t t t t t t tI I(K,K , , ) h(K Z ) (1 ) h (Z ) f (Z )= τ τ = − + − τ ⋅ + τ ⋅ . 
As a direct corollary of Proposition 1, we know that the optimal tax for a deviating home 
government is τd = 1.  Using this fact and equation (11), the home country’s payoff from a period 
d deviation is given by d * c c c s *cd d 1 d d 1 dI I(K,K , Z , ) h(K Z ) f (Z )− −= γ ⋅ τ = − γ ⋅ + .  From equation (11), 
Proposition 1, and the tax-treaty strategies, the home country’s payoff in each period after their 
period d deviation can be written as wd * c c t d 1 c s t d *ct d 1 d d 1 dI I(K,K , ,Z , ) h(K Z ) f ( Z )
− + −
− −= γ τ = − γ ⋅ + γ ⋅ . 
The gain to deviating from the tax treaty in period d can then be succinctly expressed as: 
* c c *c d c
d d 1 d d d d(K,K , ,Z , , ) I I−Ψ = Ψ γ τ τ = −  = 
c c *c s c c s *c
d 1 d d d d dh(K Z ) [h(K Z ) (1 ) h (Z )] (1 ) f (Z )−− γ ⋅ − − + − τ ⋅ + − τ ⋅ .   (12) 
Similarly, the cost of deviating from the tax treaty in period d can be written as: 
* c c c *c t d c wd
d d 1 d t t t t
t d 1




Ω = Ω γ τ τ τ δ = δ −∑ =  
t d c *c s c c s *c t d 1 c s t d *c
t t t t t d 1 d
t d 1
[h(K Z ) (1 ) h (Z ) f (Z ) h(K Z ) f ( Z )]
∞ − − + −
−
= +
δ − + − τ ⋅ + τ ⋅ − − γ ⋅ − γ ⋅∑ . (13) 
Ψd* and Ωd* are defined similarly.  A self-enforcing cooperative tax path requires that the cost of 
deviation outweighs its benefits.  This gives the following incentive compatibility constraints: 
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 d d 0Ω −Ψ ≥ ;  * *d d 0Ω −Ψ ≥   for d ∈ (1, 2, …..)  (14) 
We are interested in the lowest tax rates that satisfy each of these constraints: c *ct t{ , }τ τ  
Tax treaties generally specify a single tax rate.  We follow this convention and look for the lowest 
tax rate that satisfies both sets of incentive constraints: τt = max c *ct t{ , }τ τ .  In the symmetric case 
K = K* and c *ct tZ Z= , therefore, * cd d d 1 d t(K, ,Z , , , )−Ω = Ω = Ω γ τ τ δ , * cd d d 1 d(K, ,Z , )−Ψ = Ψ = Ψ γ τ  
and both incentive constraints bind at the same tax rate: c *ct t tτ = τ = τ . 20 
FIGURE 2 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The home country’s incentive constraint is illustrated for the first period of the treaty as a 
function of this common tax rate, τt, in Figure 2.  The mathematics underlying this figure is 
provided in Appendix A and in the proof of Proposition 2.  First, as shown in Appendix A, Ψt is 
decreasing in τt.  A higher cooperative tax rate implies less inbound FDI from foreign.  This 
reduces the tax base the home country can expropriate and reduces Ψt.  Second, as a direct result 
of Proposition 1, in the initial period of the tax treaty, when previous FDI levels are zero, the non-
cooperative outcome for all time is self-enforcing: * 1 t t(K,K , ,0,1 ,1 ,1 , )Ω γ δ =  
t 1 s s t 1
t 2
[h(K) f (0) h(K) f ( 0)]
∞ − −
=
δ + − − γ ⋅∑  = 0 = h(K) − h(K) = * 1 1(K,K , ,0,1 ,1 )Ψ γ .  To see this 
result note that if the home country deviates in the first period, then its FDI is zero regardless of 
the cooperative tax.      
C.  The Main Results in the Symmetric Case 
 In this section we show that there exists a connected set of self-enforcing tax rates in the 
initial period that Pareto dominate the non-cooperative tax rates.  We then ask whether Pareto 
optimal tax rates are immediately obtainable, i.e. whether the tax path c *ct t 0τ = τ = for all t is self-
enforcing.  If there is no irreversibility (i.e. γ = 0) and home and foreign are symmetric, then our 
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setting is equivalent to a repeated game and the standard folk theorem results obtain, i.e. that this 
outcome occurs for a discount factor close to one.21  As shown in the following proposition, 
irreversibility limits the set of initially self-enforcing outcomes so that if the extent of 
irreversibility is sufficiently large, then the standard result can not arise.  Put another way, if the 
extent of irreversibility is large enough, then even the lowest of these initial tax rates are 
inefficiently high, indicating that further reductions are desirable.  Finally, in Proposition 3, we 
show that the increase in FDI generated by this initial tax reduction creates slack in the incentive 
constraint making further tax-reductions self-enforcing.  
Proposition 2:  Consider the symmetric case.  (a.) If δ > 0 and γ < 1, then there exists a self-
enforcing path of tax-rates such that c *ct t tτ = τ = τ  < 1 for all t.  (b.) If the extent of irreversibility, 
γ, is sufficiently large, then for all δ < 1, the Pareto optimal tax path, c *ct t 0τ = τ =  for all t ≥ 1, is 
not a stationary outcome.  (c.) Furthermore, the cooperative tax τ1 is increasing in γ and 
decreasing in δ.  (d.) There exists a δF(γ) that is increasing in γ, such that for all δ ≥ δF(γ), 
c *c
t t 0τ = τ = , for all t is self-enforcing, where δF(0) < 1 < δF(1).   
Proof:  First recall that there is no FDI before the tax treaty is signed so that Z0 = 0.  Second note 
that K = K*, c *ct tZ Z=  and c *ct t tτ = τ = τ  in the symmetric case.  Therefore,  
(1 − *ctτ ) s c c s *ct t th (Z ) f (Z )+ τ  = s c s *ct th (Z ) f (Z )= .  Writing the incentive constraint for an arbitrary 
first period tax rate yields (recall that Z and Z* are functions of tax rates):  
1 t(K, ,0, , , )Ω γ τ τ δ = t 1 c s *c s t 1 *ct t 1
t 2
[h(K Z ) f (Z ) h(K) f ( Z )]
∞ − −
=
δ − + − − γ ⋅∑  ≥  
                                                                                                                                                 
20 In the asymmetric case both equations in (14) need not always hold with strict equality at the common 
tax rate. We present results suggesting which country's incentive constraint will bind in section IV.C. 
21 We show in Proposition 5 below that the symmetric case presents the easiest case for Pareto optimal 
taxes to be obtained and that they may not ever be obtained in the asymmetric case.  Proposition 2, 
therefore, considers the easiest case for Pareto optimal taxes to obtain immediately. 
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1(K, ,0, )Ψ γ τ  = c1h(K) h(K Z )− − .      (15) 
(a.)  To show that some tax reduction is possible we start by assuming that no tax reduction is 
ever possible and establish a contradiction.  In this case, taxes are set a constant level 
c c *c *c
t 1 t 1 1τ = τ = τ = τ = τ  for all t.  Substituting this constant tax rate into equation (15), totally 
differentiating the resulting expression with respect to τ1, using an envelope result for the 
optimality of Z (from equations 3 and 6), and simplifying, yields: 
*c *c
t 1 s *c t 1 s t 1 *c1 1 1 1
1 k 1 k 1
t 11 1 1
d( ) Z Z[ f (Z ) f ( Z ) ]
d
∞ − − −
=
Ω −Ψ ∂ ∂= δ τ ⋅ − γ γτ ∂τ ∂τ∑    (16) 
Taking the limit of the above derivative as τ1 → 1 from below and remembering from equation 






lim d( ) Z(1 ) f (0) 0
1 d 1
Ω −Ψ ∂δ − γ= <τ → τ − δγ ∂τ      (17) 
as long as δ is positive and γ is less than one.  As established above Ω Ψ Ω Ψ1 1 1 1 0− = − =* * , when 
τt = 1 for all t.  Therefore, from equation (17), 1(K, ,0, , )Ω γ τ δ  must lie above 1(K, ,0, )Ψ γ τ  for τt 
sufficiently close to one and Ω1 must be steeper than Ψ1 for τ1 in this range.  A similar result 
holds for the foreign country’s incentive constraint.  Hence, there exists a self-enforcing tax that 
is strictly less than one as long as both nations place some weight on the future and investment is 
not completely irreversible.   
(b.)  Suppose that τt = 0 for all t is self-enforcing.  This implies that the first period incentive 
constraint must satisfy: 
( )t 1 opt s *opt s t 1 *opt
t 1
[h(K Z ) h(K)] [f (Z ) f ( Z )] 0
∞ − −
=
δ − − + − γ ⋅ ≥∑ .   (18) 
Now, when γ approaches 1, the second bracketed term approaches zero.  The first 
bracketed term is strictly negative for all t, therefore, equation (18) is not satisfied.  This 
establishes the necessary contradiction.  Since Ω1 lies below Ψ1 for τ1  = 0 and lies above it for τ1 
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near one there must be at least one other intersection of  Ψ1 and Ω1 for τ1 ∈ (0, 1) and Ψ1 must cut 
Ω1 from above at the lowest of these intersections.22  Parts (a) and (b) are represented in Figure 2, 
where c1τ represents the lowest tax rate for which home is willing to maintain the agreement.   
(c.)  Differentiating both sides of equation (15) with respect to γ and δ we have: 
 1 1 0.∂Ψ ∂Ψ= =∂δ ∂γ   
t 1 s t 1 *c t 2 *c1
k 1 1
t 2
[ f ( Z ) (t 1) Z ]
∞ − − −
=
∂Ω = δ − γ ⋅ ⋅ − γ ⋅∂γ ∑  < 0. 
 t 2 c s *c s t 1 *c1 t t t
t 2
(t 1) [h(K Z ) f (Z ) h(K) f ( Z )]
∞ − −
=
∂Ω = − δ − + − − γ ⋅∂δ ∑  ≥ 0  
In interpreting the sign of ∂Ω1/∂δ, first note that Ω1 must be positive in any self-enforcing 
agreement and the bracketed term must therefore be positive in some time period.  Second, the 
bracketed expression is not decreasing over time (and is strictly increasing in future periods if 
either γ < 1 or if future tax reductions are expected).  An increase in the discount factor shifts 
weight to these future periods.  Figure 3 shows how changes in γ and δ shift the Ω1 curve and, 
therefore, how the lowest self-enforcing tax rate, c1τ  is affected by changes in these parameters. 
(d.)  From equation (18) we see that when γ = 0 and δ approaches 1 that c1τ  = 0 satisfies the 
incentive constraint.  This is a direct result of the assumed desirability of FDI occurring.  Denote 
the lowest δ that satisfies equation (18) when γ = 0 as δF(0).  We have just seen that δF(0) <1 and 
part (b) showed that δF(1) > 1.  Finally, we show that δF(γ) is increasing in γ.  From part (c) we 
know that Ω1 is strictly increasing (decreasing) in δ (γ).  Furthermore we have that 
 
2
t 2 s t 1 *c t 2 *c
k 1 1
t 2
(t 1) [ f ( Z ) (t 1) Z ]
∞ − − −
=
∂ Ω = − δ − γ ⋅ ⋅ − γ ⋅∂γ∂δ ∑  < 0. 
                                                 
22 Although Ωd is drawn concave we do not require this result or make this claim.  All we require for our 
results is that Ψd intersects Ωd from above at their lowest intersection and from below at a first period tax 
rate of one.  We point out, however, that a sufficient condition for concavity of Ωd is symmetric countries 
and homogeneity of hS(Z).  Finally, since Ψd and Ωd are both continuous transformations of continuous 
functions they are also continuous and the existence of this intersection is assured. 
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Hence, an increase in γ requires an increase in δ in order for the incentive constraint to be 
satisfied in the initial period.    
 
FIGURES 3 AND 4 GO APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The idea behind Proposition 2 is that when FDI is irreversible (or almost so), the costs to 
deviation are small since reductions in inbound FDI are slow to happen.  Alternatively, with 
immediate reversibility, a standard folk-theorem-type result is produced.  Increasing the extent of 
irreversibility from its minimal level has a monotonic effect on the critical discount factor 
necessary for Pareto optimal taxes to occur in the initial period.  We assume in what follows that 
governments are sufficiently short-lived so that their discount factor does not exceed this critical 
level.  Even here, however, some cooperative tax rate less than one is self-enforcing.  This tax 
reduction, in turn, generates the irreversible FDI that permits further tax reductions.    
Proposition 3:   After the initial (and each subsequent) tax reduction, additional reductions that 
were previously not incentive-compatible become self-enforcing. 
Proof:   We now show that after this initial tax reduction to τ1 further tax cuts become possible.  
From equation (4) we know that Z1 increases as τ1 falls.  We see the effect of Z1 on the incentive 
constraint in period 2 by differentiating equations (12-14): 
t d t d 1 t d 1 cd
k d 1
t d 1d 1
h (K Z ) 0
Z
∞ − − + − +
−
= +−




h (K Z ) 0,
Z −−






∂  > 0.  (19) 
Equation (19) shows that the increase in Zd-1 creates slack in the period d incentive constraint.  As 
shown in Figure (4) this slack can be taken up by a lower period d tax rate.  Since the first-period 
tax reduction generates positive FDI for both countries, slack is introduced into the foreign 
incentive constraint as well.  A reduction is, therefore, produced in the lowest mutually self-
enforcing tax rate:  τt+1 < τt.    
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 Note that this cooperative tax path is not unique.  There exists a continuum of less 
efficient tax rates between τt and 1 that are also self-enforcing, however, we feel it is natural to 
expect that the treaty would pick the lowest mutually self-enforcing tax rate in each period.     
IV.  Asymmetries 
A. Gradualism in the Asymmetric Case 
 We start by showing that our main result also holds in the more general asymmetric case 
in which capital stocks, irreversibility, and/or discount rates may differ between countries.  
 
Proposition 4:  If δ, δ* > 0 and γ, γ* < 1, then there exists a self-enforcing path of tax-rates such 
that c *ct t{ , }τ τ  < {1, 1} for all t.  Furthermore, after the initial (and each subsequent) tax 
reduction, additional reductions that were previously not incentive compatible become self-
enforcing. 
Proof:  The proof of Proposition 4 is almost identical to that of Propositions 2a, 2b and 3.  We 
only discuss the few differences here.  The incentive constraint for the first period of the tax 
treaty, in the non-symmetric case, can be written as follows:  
t 1 c *c s c c s *c s *t *c
1 1 t t t t t 1
t 2
[{h(K Z ) (1 )h (Z ) f (Z )} {h(K) f ( Z )}]
∞ −
=
Ω −Ψ = δ − + − τ + τ − + γ∑  
 − s *c c *c s c c s *c1 1 1 1 1 1[{h(K) f (Z )} {h(K Z ) (1 )h (Z ) f (Z )}]+ − − + − τ + τ  ≥ 0.  (20) 
We are still interested in examining the behavior of this constraint as tax rates approach 1.  The 
derivative of this expression with respect to the common tax rate is: 
*c *c
s *c s c s *c t 1 s *t 1 *c1 1 1 1
1 1 1 k 1 k 1
t 11 1 1




Ω −Ψ ∂ ∂= − + τ ⋅ − δγ γτ − δ ∂τ ∂τ∑  (21) 
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It is straightforward to verify that under symmetry equation (21) becomes equal to equation (16).  
In any case, because c *c *1 1Z (K,1) Z (K ,1) 0= = , when taking the limit as τ→ 1 from below 
equation (21) still yields equation (17).   
To see that Pareto-optimal taxes may not be initially self-enforcing we rewrite the home 
country’s incentive constraint under zero taxes for the asymmetric case:  
( )t 1 opt s opt s *t 1 *opt
t 1
[h(K Z ) h(K)] [h (Z ) f ( Z )] 0
∞ − −
=
δ − − + − γ ⋅ ≥∑ .   (18′) 
In the asymmetric case, this incentive constraint may be satisfied, even as γ* approaches one, if 
the home country has a lot more outbound FDI than does the foreign country making the positive 
second term larger the negative first term.  In this case, however, the second bracketed term in the 
foreign counterpart of (18′) would be negative so that foreign’s incentive constraint would not be 
satisfied.  Hence, even in the asymmetric case the requirement an agreement be incentive-
compatible for both countries limits the possibility of Pareto-optimal tax rates from obtaining.  
Furthermore, although the gain to deviating from the treaty may not be monotonically declining 
for a country that has much more outbound FDI (see Appendix A) the requirement that both 
constraints are satisfied indicates that we only have to consider the country with less outbound 
FDI, for whom this function Ψd (or Ψd*) is monotonically declining.  
The rest of the proof proceeds identically to that of Proposition 3, with the following 
modification.  The tax rate specified in the agreement is τ1 = max c *c1 1{ , }τ τ since this is the lowest 
tax rate that satisfies both incentive constraints.  Hence, the necessary reduction is in τt+1 = 
max c *ct 1 t 1{ , }+ +τ τ  < τt = max c *ct t{ , }τ τ .    
 
Because of the conventions of tax treaties in practice, we restrict attention to agreements 
in which taxes are identical between countries.  In the asymmetric case, this means that one 
nation's incentive compatibility constraint may remain slack.  Thus, there may exist Pareto 
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preferred tax reductions whereby both equations in (14) hold with equality.  Given this source of 
potential inefficiency we next ask what outcomes are obtainable when treaties are restricted to a 
common tax rate. 
B.  Attainable Outcomes  
We now examine the limit of this gradual tax-reduction path and ask if the Pareto 
efficient tax rate pair {0,0} is ever self-enforcing.  Consider home country welfare along the 
cooperative path as given by * c *ct tI(K,K , , )τ τ .  Differentiating this expression with respect to the 
common tax rate τt and using equation (3) we have: 
c *c
s c s *c s *ct t
t t t t
t t
I Zh (Z ) f (Z ) f (Z )∂ ∂= − + + τ ⋅∂τ ∂τ .     (22) 
In the symmetric case, s c s *ct th (Z ) f (Z )=  and the above derivative is negative for any positive tax 
rate.  Therefore, moving the common tax rate towards zero is always Pareto improving.  Since in 
the symmetric case the same is true for foreign, both countries would agree to all self-enforcing 
tax reductions until taxes reach the efficient level.  On the other hand, consider the case in which 
hs(⋅) is zero.  Now (22) is non-monotonic in τt and is positive for small values of τt, implying that 
the home country will not agree to completely eliminate withholding taxes.  Hence, when hs(⋅) is 
small relative to fs(⋅), there exists a strictly positive tax rate τmin such that, without side-payments, 
home will not agree to a tax rate below this level.  This demonstrates that zero taxes may not be 
obtainable between highly asymmetric countries.23  This result is summarized as Proposition 5.24 
 
Proposition 5:  Although a Pareto improvement over the non-treaty tax rates is always possible, 
Pareto efficient tax rates are never self-enforcing for sufficiently asymmetric countries. 
                                                 
23 Mayer (1981) and Kennan and Reizman (1988) show that, in the absence of side payments, globally 
efficient free trade may not be obtainable between countries of differing sizes.    
24 In Appendix B we provide an alternative proof of Proposition 5 and also show how the constraint implied 
by equation (10) may limit the possibility of Pareto optimal taxes obtaining for symmetric countries if the 
discount factor is sufficiently small. 
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 Instead of side payments, we can consider asymmetric taxes.  Although equal tax 
reductions below τmin are not welfare improving for a small home country, a small tax reduction 
by the home country coupled with a large foreign tax reduction may improve home welfare.  
Because fs(⋅) is larger than hs(⋅) in the asymmetric case we have been considering, this tax cut can 
improve foreign country welfare as well.  Despite this, unless the foreign country chooses 
negative (and distortionary) taxes the home country will never agree to zero taxes, implying that 
fully efficient FDI flows are still unattainable.  Although of theoretical interest, asymmetric tax 
rates are rarely encountered in real-world tax treaties.25  As our main focus is on characterizing 
existing tax agreements we leave the specification of optimal tax reduction paths for asymmetric 
countries for future research. 
C.  Comparative Statics and Asymmetries.  
 Although our results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric countries, it is instructive 
to consider how differences in γ and K between the two countries influences the path of self-
enforcing tax rates.  The first of these results is contained in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 6:  A once and for all increase in the extent of irreversibility of one country’s FDI  in 
period t, will:  (a.)  lower taxes in that period and in all future periods if that country’s incentive 
constraint is binding;  (b.)  raise taxes in that period and in all future periods if the other 
country’s incentive constraint is binding. 
Proof:  Assume, without loss of generality, that home’s incentive constraint is binding.  
Differentiating the incentive constraint with respect to γ and γ* yields: 
t d t d 1 c t d cd
k d 1 d 1
t d 1
h (K Z ) (t d 1) Z 0
∞ − − + −
− −
= +
∂Ω = δ ⋅ − γ ⋅ − + ⋅ γ ⋅ >∂γ ∑ ; 
                                                 
25 One example of this is the U.S. treaty with Pakistan.  While Pakistani firms enjoy reduced withholding 
tax rates in the U.S., U.S. firms do not receive preferential withholding taxes in Pakistan.  They do, 
however, benefit from increased coordination in tax laws. 
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t d s t d *c t d 1 *cd
k d d*
t d 1
[ f ( Z )] (t d) Z 0
∞ − − − −
= +
∂Ω = δ ⋅ − γ ⋅ − ⋅ γ ⋅ <∂γ ∑ ;   
c cd d
k d 1 d 1 *h (K Z ) Z 0− −
∂Ψ ∂Ψ= − − γ ⋅ ⋅ < =∂γ ∂γ .    
 
 For an intuitive explanation of the above proposition, consider an increase in home’s 
irreversibility parameter.  This reduced salvageability of home FDI reduces home’s gain from 
deviation.  Similarly, since more FDI will be trapped in foreign following a deviation, home's 
future cost of deviation increases.  Combining these indicates that an increase in γ creates slack in 
home’s incentive constraint and reduces its lowest self-enforcing tax rate both when the change 
occurs and in all future periods.  On the other hand, the increase in home’s γ reduces foreign's 
future cost of deviation because home cannot recall its capital as swiftly.  Since a foreign 
deviation takes home by surprise, foreign's gain from deviation is invariant to changes in γ.  
Together, these results show that foreign’s lowest self-enforcing tax rate is increasing in the home 
γ.  Although these changes in ctτ  and *ctτ move in opposite directions, it is important to remember 
that only one country’s incentive constraint need be binding in the asymmetric case.  If home’s 
constraint is binding, then the common tax, τt, drops, otherwise it increases.  One implication of 
Proposition 6 is that if countries are identical except in the ease with which their FDI is 
reversible, then the country with the relatively reversible FDI will drive the treaty.  Put succinctly, 
if γ > γ* is the only difference between the countries, then τt = *c c *ct t tmax{ , }τ = τ τ , for all t.  
An alternative type of asymmetry arises when countries differ in their capital stocks.  
Starting with identical countries, suppose that there is a one-time permanent increase in the 
home’s capital stock, so that K > K*.  This increases the attractiveness of FDI for home (recall 
that ∂Zt/∂K > 0 from equation (5)).  The effect on home’s incentive constraint is given by (where 
we again use the envelope result for the optimality of home’s FDI): 
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 t d c t d cd d k t k d 1
t d





∂ Ω −Ψ = δ − − − γ >∂ ∑ ,   (23) 
implying that home's incentive constraint loosens.  Put simply, an increase in home’s capital 
stock makes FDI is more profitable and home will prefer to encourage it even more than it 
currently does.  This is not always the case for the now relatively small foreign country.  The total 
effect on foreign's incentive constraint, again holding taxes constant, is 
 
* * c c
t d *c s c t d s t d cd d t d
t k t k d
t d
( ) Z Z[ h (Z ) h ( Z ) ]
K K K
∞ − − −
=
∂ Ω −Ψ ∂ ∂= δ τ ⋅ − γ ⋅ γ∂ ∂ ∂∑    (24) 
which is ambiguous in sign.  When K rises, this increases foreign's inbound FDI.  A greater 
current level of FDI for foreign to expropriate increases foreign's gain from deviation, that is 
* c
*c s cd d
d k d
Z(1 )h (Z ) 0
K K
∂Ψ ∂= − τ >∂ ∂ .  The effect of this rise in inbound FDI on the cost of a foreign 
deviation is less clear.  Since more present FDI implies that more FDI will remain in foreign after 
a deviation, this reduces foreign's cost of breaking the treaty.  At the same time, however, 
inbound FDI along the cooperative path also increases.  Unless the treaty specifies zero tax rates 
both in the current period and ever after, this rise in inbound FDI increases foreign's future tax 
revenues and increases its cost of deviation.  These effects are at odds and, therefore, yield an 
ambiguous effect.  Note that if all future taxes are zero, then an increase in K causes foreign's 
incentive constraint to bind at a higher *ctτ , implying that it would choose to deviate.  This 
mirrors the results of Proposition 5 and it suggests that the smaller, less advanced treaty partner 
may face greater difficulty in maintaining the agreement.   
V.  Conclusions 
 Before concluding, it is instructive to cast our model in a different light by reinterpreting 
tax rates as probabilities of expropriation.  Although none of our results change, this does suggest 
an intriguing line of thought.  As the BEA's (1998) data shows, the largest hosts for U.S. 
investment also send the most FDI to the U.S..  Numerous empirical studies have found that FDI 
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activity is greatest between countries that are similar in size and in relative factor endowments.26  
These results contradict Helpman’s (1984) vertical FDI model in which differences in relative 
factor supplies drive FDI.  Instead, the results are generally viewed as supportive of Markusen’s 
(1984) horizontal model in which FDI occurs between similar countries to realize firm-level 
economies of scale and avoid trade costs.  Our results provide an alternative explanation for the 
data.  In our model, bilateral FDI flows are critical since it is only through bilateral investment 
that countries can punish one another after "inhospitable" behavior.  When countries are similar, 
they will have similar outflows of FDI.  Because of this, they can credibly commit to larger 
reductions in the expropriation risk in the present.  Furthermore, similar countries are able to 
come closer to the efficient, risk-free allocation of FDI before risk reductions cease.  As a result, 
our model predicts that FDI will be greatest between similar countries, exactly the pattern found 
in the data. 
 One policy implication of this expropriation interpretation is particularly interesting for 
developing countries.  These nations have long sought out FDI as a tool for growth and expend a 
great deal of effort to attract foreign investors.  At the same time, some of these nations 
implement capital controls to prevent capital outflows from hollowing-out domestic production.  
Our model, however, suggests that in order to encourage inbound investment, it may also be 
useful to promote outbound investment or the creation of other hostages since this decreases the 
perceived probability of future expropriation.  This mirrors the export promotion advice discussed 
in the development literature (Pack, 1989), although it occurs from changes in the time 
inconsistency problem rather than comparative advantage.  Naturally, we do not claim that in 
order to promote inbound FDI developing nations should abandon all restrictions on capital 
outflows, however this is an exciting implication of our results. 
                                                 
26 Studies using U.S. data include Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Maskus (2001).  Blonigen, Davies, 
and Head (2002) find similar patterns in OECD data. 
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In summary, we have considered one facet of the commonly-used bilateral tax treaties on 
FDI.  We find that bilateral tax treaties can indeed increase FDI and improve the global allocation 
of capital relative to non-treaty outcomes.  Furthermore, when governments are unable to commit 
to their tax policies, we find that in some cases Pareto efficient tax rates can only be obtained 
when taxes are gradually reduced.  Even in those situations for which globally optimal tax rates 
are not self-enforcing, we find that improvements over the non-treaty equilibrium are still 
obtainable.27  This suggests that, much like international trade agreements, bilateral tax treaties 
are a powerful tool for increasing world welfare.  
                                                 
27 On the other hand, if government preferences place a much higher value on the profits of the 
multinational than on tax revenues, then their initial incentive to deviate is reduced.  We thank an 
anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.  Continuing on this line of thought can also 
provide an interesting political economy explanation for the observed gradualism.  In particular, if these 
same preferences gradually shift from a placing a greater weight on tax revenues to placing a greater value 
on firm profits, then the incentive constraint would also slacken over time allowing a decrease in treaty tax 
rates and an increase in FDI. 
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APPENDIX A:  The shape of the incentive constraint.   
First, in the asymmetric case,  
*c
s s *c s cd d
d k d d
d d
*c *c
t d s *c t d s t d *c s *c s cd t d
t k t k d t t
t d 1d d d
( ) Z ( )(1 ) f ( ) f (Z ) h (Z );
( ) Z ( ) Z ( )[ f (Z ) f ( Z ) f (Z ) h (Z )].
∞ − − −
= +
∂Ψ ⋅ ∂ ⋅= − τ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − +∂τ ∂τ
∂Ω ⋅ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ⋅= δ τ ⋅ ⋅ − γ ⋅ γ ⋅ + −∂τ ∂τ ∂τ∑
 
In the symmetric case s *c s ct tf (Z ) h (Z )=  and d
d
( )∂Ψ ⋅
∂τ  < 0.  In the asymmetric case this result must 
also hold as long as s cth (Z )  is not too large as compared with 
s *c
tf (Z ) .  Similarly, if the countries 
are not too asymmetric, then the sign of d
d
( )∂Ω ⋅
∂τ   is dependant on the first two terms in brackets.  
In this case, for τt near zero for all t, d
d
( )∂Ω ⋅
∂τ   is increasing.   In the main text we show that for the 
opposite case of no tax reductions ever occurring (i.e. τt = 1 for all t) that Ωd is decreasing for τt 
near one and that it is steeper than Ψd in this range.   
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APPENDIX B: Informing Outbound Investors of a Planned Deviation.   
Suppose that the government does not inform the outbound investors.  In this case, the 
home investor’s FDI allocations in the deviation period can be written as c *cd dZ Z(K,E( ))= τ  
whereas the foreign allocation remains as described in equation (11).  Because the foreign 
government is not tipped off as to the coming deviation they adhere to the cooperative tax in 
period d.  Using the superscript (alt) to denote payoffs in this case we have 
d,alt c *c s c s *c
d d d d dI h(K Z ) (1 ) h (Z ) f (Z )= − + − τ ⋅ + .  Naturally the cooperative payoff doesn’t change, 
therefore, the gain from deviating can be expressed as alt d,alt c c s *cd d d d dI I (1 ) f (Z )Ψ = − = − τ ⋅ . 
In the subsequent punishment stage, the only difference with the case in the main text is in 
home’s FDI allocation: wd,alt t d c s t d *ct d dI h(K Z ) f ( Z )
− −= − γ ⋅ + γ ⋅ .  The cost of deviating is 
alt t d c *c s c c s *c t d c s t d *c
d t t t t t d d
t d 1
[h(K Z ) (1 ) h (Z ) f (Z ) h(K Z ) f ( Z )]
∞ − − −
= +
Ω = δ − + − τ ⋅ + τ ⋅ − − γ ⋅ − γ ⋅∑ . 
The tax-treaty tax rate, therefore, must satisfy alt altd dΩ ≥ Ψ  as well as Ωd ≥ Ψd.  As long as Ωd ≥ Ψd 
the additional constraint is satisfied if alt altd d( )Ω −Ψ  − (Ωd − Ψd) ≥ 0.  Note that if this condition is 
satisfied then a deviation is less attractive (the costs minus the benefits are greater) if the 
government does not inform its investors.  Hence, a sufficient condition for the home government 
to inform its outbound investors is:    
alt alt
d d( )Ω −Ψ  − (Ωd − Ψd) = t d t d 1 c t d c *c s cd 1 d d d
t d
[h(K Z ) h(K Z )] (1 ) h (Z ) 0
∞ − − + −
−
=
δ − γ − − γ − − τ ⋅ ≥∑ , 
which is precisely equation (10). 
 We now analyze the behavior of equation (10).  Because c cd 1 dZ Z− ≤  and γ ≤ 1, the term in 
the [] brackets is positive, therefore, the above expression is increasing in δ.  Differentiating this 
expression with respect to γ we have: 
t d t d 1 c t d c t d c t d 1 c
k d 1 d 1 k d d
t d
( ) {[h (K Z ) (t d 1) Z ] [h (K Z ) (t d) Z ]}
∞ − − + − − − −
− −
=
∂ ⋅ = δ − γ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ γ ⋅ − − γ ⋅ − ⋅ γ ⋅∂γ ∑  
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Remembering that h(⋅) is strictly concave, we see that the above derivative must be positive as 
long as δ is greater than zero.  Differentiating (10) with respect to τt, and again using the envelope 
result from equation (3) yields: 
c
t d t d c t d s cd
k d d*c
t d 1t d
Z ( )( ) [h (K Z ) ] h (Z )
∞ − − −
= +
∂ ∂ ⋅⋅ = δ − γ ⋅ ⋅ γ ⋅ +∂τ ∂τ∑ ,  
which is negative for τt near 1.  Hence, small tax reductions create slack in equation (10).  As 
taxes approach zero the above derivative may become positive, so that equation (10) may become 
binding as taxes drop further and may limit the magnitude of tax reductions.  To further see this 
effect of equation (10) in later periods of the tax treaty, note that it is decreasing in cd 1Z −  so that 
increases in cd 1Z −  reduces the slack in equation (10). 
 As an alternative method of seeing how the additional constraint may limit tax 
reductions, consider the incentive constraints in the first period in which zero taxes are obtained: 
period T.  In the case presented in the main text this can be written as: 
t T opt s opt t T 1 c s t T *opt
T T T 1
t T
[h(K Z ) h (Z ) h(K Z ) f ( Z )]
∞ − − + −
−
=
Ω −Ψ = δ − + − − γ ⋅ − γ ⋅∑ . 
This expression is clearly positive if γ < 1 and hs(Zopt) ≥ fs(Z*opt). 
The additional incentive constraint in period T is: 
alt alt t T opt s opt t T opt s t T *opt s *opt
T T
t T 1
[h(K Z ) h (Z ) h(K Z ) f ( Z )] f (Z )
∞ − − −
= +
Ω −Ψ = δ − + − − γ ⋅ − γ ⋅ −∑ .   
This expression is positive if γ < 1 and hs(Zopt) ≥ fs(Z*opt) and if δ is sufficiently large.  Hence, we 
see not only the result of Proposition 5, but also the claim in footnotes 21 and 24. 
 36
TABLE 1:  Tax Rate Reductions. 
Reductions in bold. 






Royalties  3 
      
U.S. Non-treaty Tax  30 30 30 30 
      
Argentina-Sweden 1962 4 no reductions no reductions no reductions 15 
 1995 10 15 12.5 10 
Australia-U.S. 1953 4 15 15 30 30 
 1984 15 15 10 10 
Barbados-U.S. 1987 4 5 15 12.5 12.5 
 1993 5 15 5 5 
Canada-U.S. 1941 4 15 15 15 15 
 1985 10 15 15 10 
 1996 5 5 15 10 0 
France-U.S. 1940 4 5 15 10 5 
 1987 5 15 0 5 
Germany-U.S. 1954 4 15 15 0 0 
 1991 5 15 0 0 
India-U.S. 1990 4 15 25 15 20 
 1995 6 15 25 15 15 
Indonesia-U.S. 1990 4 15 15 15 15 
 1995 6 15 15 15 10 
 1997 10 15 15 10 
Israel-Netherlands 1973 4 15 15 10 5 
 1996 5 15 10 5 
Japan-Norway 1959 4 15 15 15 15 
 1967 10 15 10 10 
 1992 5 15 10 10 
Source: Diamond and Diamond (1998). 
1 The most favorable withholding tax available.  The percentage of equity holdings necessary to 
receive this tax rate varies from treaty to treaty. 
2 Withholding tax on interest payments to non-financial institutions. 
3 Withholding tax on royalty payments for industrial royalties. 
4 Year treaty began. 
5 Not part of an actual treaty revision, tax rates reported by Price-Waterhouse (1996). 
6 Reduction specified by the initial version of the treaty. 
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Figure 3:  γ’ > γ    δ’ > δ 
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Figure 4: Zd-1 > Zd-2 
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